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Decision-making has traditionally been viewed as detached from the neural systems of sensory perception and motor 
function. Consequently, motor areas have played a relatively minor role in discussions surrounding the control pro-
cesses and neural origins of decision-making. Empiric evidence, catalysed by technological advances in the past two 
decades, has proven that motor areas have an integral role in decision-making. They are involved in the generation, 
modulation, maintenance and execution of decisions and actions. They also take part in a complex hierarchical assess-
ment of multi-modal inputs to ensure that the most appropriate action is generated given the context presented. Clinical 
conditions such as, alien hand syndrome and utilisation behaviour exemplify the importance of these regulatory con-
trols. This review charts the trajectory of our understanding of the hidden role of motor areas in decision-making and 
refl ects upon the implications of our deepened understanding. The convergence of evidence from multiple modalities 
underpinning our current knowledge is discussed and the potential applications thereof considered.
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INTRODUCTION
We like to think that our destiny is sculpted by 
the conscious decisions we make along the way. 
However, the simplicity of such a thought is as 
deceptive as it is alluring: humans tend to over-
estimate the degree of conscious control they 
wield over their decisions. Perhaps it is because 
of this fallacy that we are so taken aback by the 
blatantly irrational decisions we see ourselves 
and others make during times of turmoil, low 
mood or extreme anxiety. Simply put, it is all too 
easy to forget the degree to which we are gov-
erned by our emotions and instincts. We have a 
tendency to idealise ourselves as rational crea-
tures capable of making clear, logical decisions 
- and ultimately, actions - based on the informa-
tion at hand, the environmental context and our 
past experiences.
Decision-making refers to the cognitive pro-
cess of evaluating a number of possibilities, and 
selecting the most appropriate thereof in order 
to further a specifi c goal, or task. This faculty is 
a fundamental component of executive function. 
The debate as to whether, or not we have the ca-
pacity to make free choices is neither new, nor 
settled. However, the cross-cultural experiential 
phenomenon in humans of a subjective sense of 
control in volition is well-established (Sarkis-
sian et al., 2010).
Traditionally, psychological theories have 
considered the process of decision-making to 
be distinct, higher and separate from the neural 
systems of sensory perception and motor func-
tion. Motor areas have thus played a relatively 
minor role in discussions surrounding the con-
trol processes and neural origins of decision-
making. Research narratives and hypotheses 
were dominated by the prevailing dogma that 
decision-making was simply composed of two 
broad stages with a signifi cant level of interac-
tion between the two. The fi rst stage, occurring 
in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), encompassed 
predominantly cognitive - or executive - features 
of decision-making. The second stage, originat-
ing from the limbic regions, concerned itself 
with the infl uential role of emotion (Bechara et 
al., 2000).
It is only in the past two decades that motor re-
gions have begun to be afforded increased atten-
tion. They are, after all, known to be crucial in the 
planning, initiation and execution of movement. 
Action has traditionally been portrayed as repre-
senting the endpoint of cognition however, this 
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assertion is being challenged and consequently 
the lines between executive and motor functions 
are fading. Action is increasingly being viewed 
as a cognitive process in its own right. Research-
ers from various fi elds within cognitive neuro-
science are actively striving to re-defi ne the role 
of motor regions in the hope of gaining a deeper 
appreciation of their complexity and the extent 
of their involvement in the decision process. The 
nascent fi eld of “decision neuroscience” has pre-
sented innumerate fascinating and challenging 
questions. Are these motor regions purely lim-
ited to a “back-seat” role of silent effectors, or do 
they have a more complex modulatory function? 
What role do these areas have in decision-gen-
eration? How does learning affect this role and 
what happens when they are damaged?
DISCUSSION
Classical views of cortical motor area function
In 1870, it was fi rst demonstrated experimen-
tally that electrical stimulation applied to the 
pre-central cortex was capable of eliciting limb 
movements (Fritsch and Hitzig, 1870). Fulton 
(1935) fi rst proposed - and initiated the cascade 
of - subdivision of the motor cortex into primary 
and pre-motor regions. Intra-operative electrical 
stimulation later gifted neuroscience with the 
somatotopic map of the primary motor cortex, 
which famously became known as Penfi eld’s 
homonculus (Penfi eld and Boldrey 1937; Pen-
fi eld and Rasmussen, 1952). This was undoubt-
edly a watershed moment in the trajectory of our 
knowledge of motor function. The hierarchical 
and sensorimotor machine models later put for-
ward by the prolifi c Hughlings Jackson (1958) 
were emphatically challenged by evidence from 
landmark anatomical studies on non-human pri-
mates in the 1990s demonstrating non-primary 
motor cortical areas with direct projections to 
the spinal cord (Dum and Strick, 1991).
Division of labour - a brief overview of the mo-
tor areas
The primary motor cortex (M1) is responsible 
for the execution of actions and is somatotopi-
cally organised. Each side of the body is under 
contralateral hemispheric control. The premo-
tor cortex is involved in action preparation. The 
lateral part of the premotor cortex is associated 
with linking objects in the environment with a 
repertoire of specifi c actions. It does so by tak-
ing advantage of the structural affordances prof-
fered by the object presented and uses these heu-
ristically to help determine the most appropriate 
action in a given context. The medial premotor 
cortex is also known as the supplementary motor 
area (SMA). The SMA is associated with pos-
tural control, locomotion and the performance 
of well-rehearsed actions: these are movements 
which require minimal monitoring of the sur-
rounding environment (Graziano and Afl alo, 
2007). The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
has connections with the motor cortex and spi-
nal cord and is also closely connected with the 
pre-frontal cortex (PFC). A functional overlap is 
suggested to exist in the ACC and hence, a trans-
lative role - in converting intentions into actions 
- has been proposed for this region (Paus, 2001).
Conceptualising the convergence of cognition 
and action
We are constantly making decisions in our 
lives. The sheer fl uidity with which it comes to 
us is astounding. Optimal, and seemingly ef-
fortless, human behaviour belies continuous 
analysis of incoming multimodal sensory infor-
mation. Contextual factors are then weighted in 
deciding between competing potential actions 
and the most appropriate behaviour is eventually 
selected (Bestmann, 2006). The physical param-
eters of the ultimate action must also be deter-
mined prior to execution. But how to possibly 
reconcile all of these processes into a feasible, 
integrated model for decision-making and action 
behaviour?
Cisek (2006) challenged the established no-
tion that decision and action planning were seri-
al processes spatially separate from one another. 
He proposed a computational model that sees 
potential decision and action alternatives com-
peting simultaneously across multiple stages of 
the cortical hierarchy (Bestmann, 2006). The 
model he proposed was of a unifi ed process, as 
distinct from previous “separatist” hypotheses. 
The experimental paradigm employed simula-
tion of anatomically-informed neural networks 
to demonstrate evidence of the involvement of 
specifi c premotor areas (dorsal premotor cortex 
i.e., PMd) in actual decision-making. Spatial 
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features, salience and valence information were 
combined and weighted accordingly to ultimate-
ly determine which of the competing represen-
tations would come out on top. Decisions took 
place in an all-or-nothing manner once a certain 
“quenching threshold” has been met in the PMd 
(Grossberg, 1973; Bestmann, 2006). The model 
was supported by existing electrophysiological 
(Cisek and Kalaska, 2005) and behavioural data 
(Bock and Eversheim, 2000) based on similar 
suppositions.
Connectional complexity of the cingulate cor-
tex
The ACC’s extensive (Barbas and Pandya, 
1989) motor, spinal cord and PFC connections 
make it a likely candidate for having a role in the 
translation or, modulation of decisions into ac-
tions. The cingulate sulcus in particular exempli-
fi es the high degree of connectional complexity 
observed in this area. It represents a confl uence 
of inputs from the PFC, M1 and SMA in addition 
to giving rise to corticospinal projections (Dum 
and Strick, 1991). Paus’ (2001) review article on 
the role of the ACC discussed the convergence 
of cognitive and motor processes with the pro-
cesses involved in maintaining the arousal state. 
Positron emission tomography (PET) has been 
employed to discern if the ACC is involved in 
the willed control of actions (Paus et al., 1993). 
Paus et al. used a behavioural model to try to 
identify whether differential ACC engagement 
was observed based on the output system used 
to execute the response. In the experiment, sim-
ple responses were challenged by the presence 
of over-learned stimulus-response alternatives. 
PET fi ndings confi rmed differential activation 
based on whether the motor output was manual, 
oculomotor or verbal.
Electrophysiological correlates
The error-related negativity (ERN) is an 
event-related potential (ERP) that peaks at ap-
proximately 100 ms after movement onset. It is 
characteristically associated with error detection 
and confl ict monitoring. The ERN’s neural ori-
gins have been localised in the area of the ACC 
(Dehaene et al., 1994). The PFC-ACC connec-
tions have been shown to be crucial for ERN 
generation (Gehring and Knight, 2000). This is 
highlighted by the observation that patients with 
unilateral lesions to the lateral PFC display ERN 
in response to both erroneous and correct items; 
they are also less likely to demonstrate “correc-
tive behaviour” (Paus, 2001). This evidence sug-
gests a role for the ACC in corrective behaviour 
and judgement.
Automatic motor responses
Saccades and visual grasp refl exes are exam-
ples of automatic activation of motor responses. 
In these cases, perceptual processing of a visual 
stimulus occurs which culminates in the execu-
tion of a motor action without the intention of 
the observer to act (McBride et al., 2012). Vi-
sual objects can automatically generate motor 
responses and they do so via their structural af-
fordances. These affordances refer to facilitative 
features of the object suggestive of its function 
and manner of use. When an object is observed, 
potential motor plans are generated based on 
data presented. Functional neuroimaging stud-
ies have demonstrated the exquisite sensitivity 
of these visual systems by showing that motor 
areas are activated by simply looking at an ob-
ject (Grèzes and Decety, 2002), without neces-
sarily the intention to act upon its presence. We 
are told from a young age, “we learn by doing, 
not by seeing” however, this neuroimaging evi-
dence raises intriguing philosophical questions 
which blur the boundaries of thought and action, 
hitherto perceived as categorically distinct from 
one another.
Lessons from clinical neurology
Automatic activation plays a vital role in ev-
eryday life: facilitating desirable responses and 
inhibiting others is crucial for normal function-
ing in a dynamic environment rich in diverse 
visual stimuli. This ability to inhibit inappropri-
ate responses is crucial: otherwise effi cient goal-
directed behaviour cannot occur (McBride et al., 
2012). Its central role in ensuring day-to-day 
functionality is laid bare in conditions such as, 
alien hand syndrome and utilisation behaviour, 
wherein such behaviour becomes exceedingly 
diffi cult.
These striking conditions demonstrate what 
happens when the volitional restraints exerted 
to suppress these automatic actions in response 
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to an object are released. Patients with alien 
hand syndrome reach and grasp for objects in 
their environment at random. They are aware 
that the movements are occurring and that they 
originate from their own body however, they do 
not experience any subjective feeling of control 
over these actions whatsoever. (Scepkowski and 
Cronin-Golumn, 2003). In utilisation behaviour, 
similar phenomena are observed except in this 
case the actions are usually purposeful (Boc-
cardi et al., 2002). For example, an individual 
with this condition may be irresistibly drawn to 
repeatedly opening and closing the drawers in a 
desk as they walk past. The brain region affected 
in these conditions is predominantly the SMA 
however, damage to the corpus callosum, pari-
etal lobes and basal ganglia can also be implicat-
ed in similar conditions (Boccardi et al., 2002).
Decision neuroscience: fertile ground at the 
crossroads of research
Decision neuroscience is a relatively new 
fi eld that has grown steadily over the past two 
to three decades. As the above examples have il-
lustrated, it has fi rmly shed its reliance on purely 
psychological paradigms and now transcends 
disciplines and modalities: encompassing every-
thing from single-neuron recordings to non-in-
vasive functional neuroimaging and everything 
in-between. It is more intellectually accessible 
and less abstract than other areas in neuroscience 
and hence, its popularity and lure is unsurpris-
ing. Additionally, the potential for exponential 
growth in our understanding carries obvious im-
mediate appeal and will certainly bear potential 
for wider interest outside of cognitive neurosci-
ence. The study of economics, marketing, arti-
fi cial intelligence, investment psychology and 
risk management are to name but a few of its 
many plausible applications. The psychology of 
decision-making has an undeniable philosophi-
cal legacy. And this inheritance has proved dif-
fi cult to avoid, if not inevitable. However, rather 
than being disheartened by this spectre, decision 
neuroscience promises to provide the empiric 
evidence needed to aid us in addressing the neu-
ral basis of many perplexing questions regarding 
concepts of free will, conscious and unconscious 
volition, agency and individual culpability.
CONCLUSION
Motor areas have an integral role in decision-
making. They are involved in the generation, 
modulation, maintenance and execution of deci-
sions and actions. They take part in a complex 
hierarchical assessment of multimodal inputs 
with a view toward ensuring that the most ap-
propriate action is generated given the context. 
The psychopathology demonstrable in patients 
with frontal lobe syndromes offers insight into 
the crucial need for executive controls for nor-
mal functioning. In order for humans to engage 
intelligently and effi ciently with their environ-
ment, the integrity of these cortical connections 
must be ensured. Decision-making and action 
planning can however, no longer be considered 
as processes, for the most part, limited to the 
prefrontal cortices. Empiric evidence has prov-
en otherwise and demonstrated that the increase 
in prominence of the motor areas in this regard 
is both timely and deserved. Furthering our un-
derstanding of cognitive systems such as this in 
a meaningful, cross-disciplinary and integrative 
manner remains an ongoing ambition previous-
ly precluded by technological limitations. Re-
search into the applications of the neural basis 
of decision-making will no doubt prove to be a 
vibrant, highly competitive and potentially ex-
tremely lucrative pursuit.
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